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INTRODUCTION
Existing copyright law is not well-suited to handle the
transmission of copyrighted works over the Internet. Generally
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speaking, copyright law grants exclusive rights to copyright owners
that others cannot exercise without authorization One of these
exclusive rights is the right of reproduction, which revolves around
the concept of a "copy."2 Thus, under copyright law, unauthorized
copying of a copyrighted work creates a prima facie case for copyright
infringement.3 At the same time, copying is a core function of
computers and networks of computers.4  Neither individual
computers nor the Internet can function without the ability to copy
data within a computer or between networked computers,
respectively. Because so much copying is required, and because
asking for permission each time a copy is made would be terribly
impractical, the only realistic way the Internet can work is the way it
does: almost all copying is done without explicit permission. Even
when copyright owners place their works online with the intent that
others make use of those works, copyright law does not have a well-
developed mechanism for facilitating such use.
When there is a fundamental conflict between the law and the
workings of the online world, one of two things is bound to happen:
either the law will change to meet the demands of the digital world, or
the digital world will change to comply with the law. At present,
neither of these changes has occurred to resolve the fundamental
conflict between copyright law and the technology developed to make
the Internet useful and powerful. Eventually, a catalyst will bring this
problem into the spotlight. When that time comes, courts are likely
to seek a way to resolve the conflict without destroying the utility of
the Internet. Largely through the use of Google as a case study, this
Comment analyzes how this gap between law and reality might be
resolved by extending the implied license doctrine.
Part I defines both opt-in and opt-out systems, describes how
copyright use is an opt-in system and the Internet is largely an opt-out
system, and explains why there is a major conflict between these two
systems. Part II reviews the development of copyright law's
definition of a "copy" in digital environments. Part III discusses the
development of the implied license doctrine. Part IV analyzes Field
v. Google, Inc., a recent federal court case that applied the implied
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
2. See id. "Copies" are defined in § 101.
3. See id. § 501(a).
4. In order for any computer, networked or not, to use data, it must have a working
copy of the data in its main memory, or RAM. See, e.g., RAM, in DICTIONARY OF




license doctrine to the Internet context. Part V contrasts implied
license with another existing copyright law doctrine, fair use, and
explains why implied license works better. Part VI provides some
examples of how a recent application of the implied license doctrine
may be used to bridge the gaps between copyright law and current
practices on the Internet.
I. OPT-IN AND OPT-OUT SYSTEMS
A. Opt-in Systems Defined and Explained
An opt-in system is one where an individual must choose to
participate in the system.6 By default, an individual is not a part of
the system and remains outside the system until choosing to become a
part of it.' An example of an opt-in system in the real world may help
to illustrate the idea. Supermarket loyalty programs are opt-in
systems because customers must sign up for the program and then
display or scan their loyalty cards when they check out.
Opt-in systems have several important benefits. First, an opt-in
system preserves personal autonomy-the individual is not included
unless he wants to be. This allows him the freedom to balance the
costs and benefits of joining the system and make the choice of
whether to join on his own. Second, opt-in systems place the burden
on the system itself to gain individual participation. This is valuable
where the automatic inclusion of individuals would be intrusive or
unfair, or where the system itself is valuable enough to make it
worthwhile for people to take the time to opt in. In the supermarket
loyalty cards example, an individual can choose for herself whether
the savings in grocery costs outweigh her lost privacy if the store
maintains a list of her purchases.
B. Control of Copyrighted Works Is an Opt-in System
The Copyright Act8 operates by first granting specific exclusive
rights to copyright owners and then by enumerating a set of
exceptions to those exclusive rights. Section 106 of the Copyright Act
states that "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to [exercise] and to authorize" others to exercise any of the
enumerated rights, including the rights of reproduction, preparation
6. See, e.g., KIM MACPHERSON, PERMISSION BASED E-MAIL MARKETING THAT
WORKS! 11 (2001) (defining opt-in in the context of e-mail marketing).
7. Id.
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332.
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of derivative works, distribution, public performance, and public
display.9 Sections 107 through 122 limit the scope of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights, many of which are the complex result of
negotiation between commercial interests.10 If one acts without the
permission of a copyright owner in violation of any of the exclusive
rights, the copyright owner has a strong case for infringement." This
statute is what makes the system an opt-in system: without the
copyright owner choosing (opting in) to allow others to exercise the
exclusive rights granted under the statute, anyone exercising those
rights is infringing the owner's copyright. In short, nobody can legally
exercise the owner's exclusive rights without the owner's permission
or a statutory exception,"2 making the use of copyrighted works an
opt-in system.13
C. Opt-out Systems Defined and Explained
An opt-out system is one in which an individual must choose to
be removed from participation in the system. By default, the
individual is a part of the system and remains in the system until
choosing to be removed. A well-known example of an opt-out system
is the popular do-not-call registry. 4 In this example, the default state
is that telemarketers may call residential phone numbers, but the
owners of those numbers may choose to be put on a list from which
telemarketers cannot call. By placing themselves on this do-not-call
registry, these people are opting out of the system which permits
telemarketers to call them.
Like opt-in systems, opt-out systems also have important
benefits. First, an opt-out system has the potential to be more
valuable to the operator of the system than an opt-in system because
it will include more people by default. Second, an opt-out system
allows for the existence of systems that would otherwise be
impracticable or prohibitively expensive. An opt-out system
9. Id. § 106.
10. See id. §§ 107-122; JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-63 (2001)
(explaining how copyright laws have been developed in the United States).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
12. See id. § 106.
13. In a recent case, Kahle v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit
discusses copyright law historically as an opt-in regime that has been changed to an opt-
out regime. See id. at 666-67. To distinguish, Kahle's argument is about whether
copyright protection applies at all. This Comment addresses whether uses of works
already protected by copyright are permitted. See Lessig Blog, Kahle v. Ashcroft,
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/003602.shtml (Nov. 13, 2006, 14:43 PST).
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3).
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accomplishes this by placing the burden on individuals to remove
themselves from the system. This burden shift is also enormously
valuable when individuals would not have enough incentive to join on
their own. The next section details why the Internet can exist only as
an opt-out system for these very reasons.
D. The Internet Is an Opt-out System
The Internet was designed to be an open system15 in the sense
that any computer, using a set of standard communication protocols,
16
can communicate with other networked computers without explicit
permission. In practice, much of the Internet operates as an opt-out
system. It is extraordinarily common for people to view a website
without explicit permission from the website's owner. Google and
other commercial search engines copy and index entire websites
without anyone's permission.
Classifying opt-out systems based on their enforcement
mechanism separates those systems into several categories. Some
opt-out systems are enforced by technology, others are enforced by
law, and still others are enforced only by community social norms. 7
Each of these is examined in turn below.
Basic website accessibility on the World Wide Web is an example
of an opt-out system enforced by technology. When someone creates
a website, by default, others can access it.18 If a website owner wants
to restrict access, she must take affirmative steps to block access; in
other words, she must opt out. She might opt out and block
unwanted access by Internet Protocol ("IP") address 9 or by requiring
a user account and/or password. In these opt-out systems, the
15. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 23
(2006).
16. This set of protocols is called TCP/IP. See id.; TCP/IP Reference Page, http://
www.protocols.com/pbook/tcpipl.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
17. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 89 (2000)
(explaining how these various forms of enforcement work in cyberspace).
18. After a person creates a website, anyone who knows the location of the site can go
to it. The most common location information for a website is its uniform resource locator
("URL"). See, e.g., URL, in DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 4, at 522.
19. An IP address is a set of four numbers used to represent a computer's location on
the Internet. NetDictionary, http://www.netdictionary.com/i.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2007). A server can be programmed to exclude users with specific IP addresses or from
within certain ranges of IP addresses. A useful analogy is the telephone system. If
somebody has a phone number, then by default, you can call it. No permission is required.
Someone might opt out of this by having the phone company block certain unwanted
callers.
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technology electronically enforces the decision to opt out.20 For
example, if a person does not know the password to a password-
protected site, he cannot access it because the technology does not
permit access.
A second type of opt-out system is one enforced by law. For
example, the do-not-call registry is based on a specific statute's
provision allowing individuals to opt out of receiving certain phone
calls. Each person's decision to opt out can be enforced by a state
attorney general or by private action.2 This system is not enforced by
technology because telemarketers can still physically make calls to
those on the list; they just do so at their own (legal) risk.
Google's decision whether to include individual web pages in its
index and search results is based on a third type of opt-out system-
one enforced only by community norms. Although it has stopped
publishing an exact number, Google had indexed 2 over eight billion
web pages as of September 2005.3 It did not ask permission to index
any of these web pages. If a website is online and discoverable,24
Google's robot25 will make a copy of the page and add the page to its
searchable index. If a website owner decides that she does not want
Google to index her site, she must take an affirmative step to tell
Google not to do so. She has several options. She can always make
use of the opt-out system enforced by technology and block access to
her site in other ways, but this is not a good solution if she wants her
site to remain available to others. Instead, she can take advantage of
Google's own opt-out system. She can leave instructions26 on her
20. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 20 (describing regulation of behavior in cyberspace
through technology).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), (f) (2000).
22. Indexing is the term used to describe how search engines collect data. Search
engines have automated programs called "robots" (or "spiders") that visit as many
websites as they can discover. For each one, the robot copies the page onto a computer
owned by the search engine and creates an index of all of the data on the page. All of this
data is then ordered so that when users search for the data, the search engine can find it
efficiently. See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (2006).
23. See John Markoff, How Many Pages in Google? Take a Guess, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2005, at C8.
24. A website is "discoverable" when there is chain of links leading to it, starting from
a site that the search engine already knows about. See CHRIS SHERMAN & GARY PRICE,
THE INVISIBLE WEB: UNCOVERING INFORMATION SOURCES SEARCH ENGINES CAN'T
SEE 33 (2001).
25. Google's robot is appropriately named "Googlebot." See How Google Crawls My
Site, http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/topic.py?topic=8843 (last visited Feb.
17,2007).
26. These instructions must be given either using a file called robots.txt or using meta-




website telling the Google robot ("Googlebot") not to index it.
7
Google tells its users that it will not index websites that opt out by
using these measures, but this promise is not expressed in any
contract or agreement and is not enforceable by technology. 8 The
instructions serve merely to notify Google of the website owner's
preferences, not as a technological lock preventing Google from
indexing the site. Accordingly, this system is not really enforced by
anything other than Google's self-restraint and compliance with the
norms of the search industry.
The very value of the Internet is based on this kind of opt-out
system. Compare the Google example with the supermarket loyalty
card program. Unlike the supermarket loyalty card system, in which
customers have a strong enough incentive to opt in and join the
system, Google has no mechanism to create incentives for website
owners to opt in to inclusion in Google's search index. The
transaction costs that Google would incur to secure permission to
index every website would be overwhelming. The same is true for
individual Internet users. The transaction costs in getting permission
before viewing every website would be so high that people would be
likely to stop visiting websites. An opt-in Internet would be virtually
unusable.
E. The Conflict
As described above, copyright law is an opt-in system and the
Internet operates on an opt-out basis. These differing systems
overlap frequently, causing a great amount of conflict. Almost
everything on the web is subject to copyright law,29 and, at the same
time, it is impossible to use the web without making copies. A user's
web browser will make at least two copies, one in RAM3 and another
on the hard disk in a cache folder.31 In addition, a search engine
cannot index a page without making a copy. These electronic copies
27. See Removing My Content from the Google Index, http://www.google.com/
webmasters/remove.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007); Remove Part of Your Website,
http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=35303 (last visited
Feb. 17, 2007).
28. Remove Part of Your Website, supra note 27.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. RAM stands for random access memory and is the main memory of a typical
computer. See RAM, supra note 4; Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp.
2d 734, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
31. Cached files are retained for efficiency purposes by web browsers. See How and
Why To Clear Your Cache, http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/ie6/using/howto/
customizing/clearcache.mspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (explaining the role of the
Internet Explorer browser's cache).
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are certainly copies in the everyday sense of the word; but the
Copyright Act has a more specific definition of "copy," which is
explained in Part II.A. The extent of the conflict between the opt-in
copyright system and the opt-out Internet depends on the extent that
technological "copies" fall within the legal definition of "copy,"
because the opt-out Internet does not require permission from
copyright owners before a user can browse any of the copyrighted
work the owner put online. If Google indexes the entire web at least
once every month32-which, according to a recent court case, it
does-it may be committing copyright infringement over eight billion
times a month.33 Because a single instance of copyright infringement
can result in up to $150,000 in statutory damages without proof of any
actual damages,34 the potential damages in any particular month for
Google's infringements could easily exceed $1,200 trillion, more than
100 times the U.S. national debt.
A natural response to the description of this conflict is disbelief
that the entire population of Internet users might be acting in a
potentially illegal manner. If this were such a huge problem one
might expect that it would have been the central issue in a few
significant cases by now. A major reason that it has not been litigated
is the lack of incentive to sue and a lack of actual harm. However,
with Google's rapid growth and expanding pocketbook, many
copyright owners are becoming irked that Google is profiting from
unauthorized and uncompensated use of their works. As Google's
revenue continues to grow, inevitably more copyright owners will
seek what they believe to be their "cut." This change is already
beginning to result in litigation against search engines.36
As the issue is brought into focus through litigation, courts will
probably avoid ruling in a way that would effectively cripple the
Internet and send shock waves across the world. Instead, courts will
probably seek to allow copyright owners to retain control over their
32. See Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1124 (D. Nev. 2006) (stating that
Google's cache is kept for approximately fourteen to twenty days, implying that Google's
index is refreshed at least that often).
33. See Markoff, supra note 23.
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000).
35. See U.S. National Debt Clock, http://www.brillig.com/debt-clock (last visited Feb.
17, 2007) (stating that the debt is $8.74 trillion as of February 17, 2007).
36. Google has been involved in several cases that were decided in early 2006. See,
e.g., Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (accusing Google of infringing the plaintiffs copyright
by making cached copies of his copyrighted works available to Internet users); Perfect 10
v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (accusing Google of infringing




exclusive rights without significantly damaging the utility of the web.
There are two legal solutions that are most appealing: fair use3 7 and
implied license. Although fair use might work to some degree, it is a
less effective solution than implied license.38 The implied license is
also a more natural fit to the problem. Common sense suggests that
many copyright owners who put their work online are not ignorant of
the nature of the Internet, and certain uses of their work should be
expected.
While it is one thing to suggest that the sole act of putting
copyrighted work online automatically grants an implied license to
make certain uses of the work, it is a far more difficult problem to
define the scope of that license. This Comment attempts to address
this problem by answering two questions. Can the implied license
doctrine allow certain uses of copyrighted works on the Internet?
And if so, how?
II. DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Two aspects of copyright law are important to understanding the
scope of the problem described in Part I. The first has to do with how
the Copyright Act and the cases interpreting it define "copy" in the
digital environment. The second has to do with the broadening of
works covered by copyright law, due largely to the removal of two
statutory copyright formalities, registration and notice.
A. Defining "Copy" in the Digital Environment
The definition of "copy" is important because the term is used in
the definition of two exclusive rights held by the copyright owner.
The copyright owner is given the exclusive right "to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords"39 and "to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."4
Copies are defined in the Copyright Act as "material objects,
other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device."'" Thus, to be a copy, a work must be
37. See infra Part V.A.
38. See infra Part V.B.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 101.
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"fixed." The Act further provides that a "work is 'fixed' in a tangible
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration."42 Fixation is therefore a requirement for infringement of
the copyright owner's rights of reproduction and distribution.
Making copies (in the nonlegal sense of the word) is a crucial
part of the digital environment. Neither individual computers nor the
Internet can function without making copies. A simple example will
help make this clear. Suppose a computer user seeks to view a
website. The user types in a URL,43 and his computer looks up the
location of the server where the website is stored.' The user's
request is forwarded across the Internet, and the data is split into
packets and sent back across the Internet to the user.45 There is no
single wire between the user and the server-a series of routers
46
transmit the data across the network, each one making an electronic
copy of the data to send to the next destination. The Copyright Act
specifically excludes these copies from copyright infringement
lawsuits.47 When the packets arrive and are assembled at the user's
computer, the computer will usually make at least two copies, one in
RAM48 for immediate use and another in a cache49 folder on the hard
disk for possible later use. All of this copying is fully automatic, and
users need not be aware of it.
The crucial question as to whether computer-made electronic
copies are "copies" as defined by the Copyright Act was not decided
until 1993, in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,0 where the
Ninth Circuit held that "the loading of software into the RAM creates
a copy under the Copyright Act."51 In MAI, the alleged infringing
42. Id.
43. See URL, supra note 18, at 522. URL, or uniform resource locator, consists of a
string of characters specifying a protocol to use and the server to contact. For example,
the URL for the University of North Carolina's web page is http://www.unc.edu.
44. The domain name server ("DNS") facilitates this lookup system. See, e.g.,
Domain Name Server, in DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 4, at 163.
45. See, e.g., Packet Switching, in DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 4, at 378.
46. See, e.g., Router, in DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 4, at 457-58.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). Some routers also make cached copies so that the distribution
of widely-requested files is more efficient. These copies are also immune from copyright
infringement lawsuits. Id. § 512(b).
48. See supra note 30.
49. See supra note 31.
50. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
51. Id. at 519.
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party merely turned on a computer to repair it.5 2 By turning on the
computer, the copyrighted operating system software was loaded
from the hard disk into RAM.53 Since Peak was not a licensed user of
the operating system, the copying constituted infringement.54 The
court noted that the fixation requirement was met when Peak
"load[ed] the software into RAM and [was] then able to view the
system error log and diagnose the problem with the computer."55
MAI was followed by a series of cases agreeing that a copy made
from another medium into RAM constitutes copying for copyright
infringement purposes.56 In 1998, Congress intervened by enacting
the Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act,57 which
permits individual computer owners to have their computers repaired
by third parties using copyrighted software.58 By softening the result
in MAI with a specific exception for MAI-type facts, Congress
reinforced the underlying principle that RAM copies are sufficiently
fixed to constitute a "copy" under the Copyright Act.
While this interpretation of fixation has been fairly entrenched in
the law with respect to end users, one circuit recently chose to carve
out an exception to the general principle as applied to Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs").5 9 In CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet,
Inc.,6" the Fourth Circuit held that temporary electronic copies made
by ISPs in the process of passively and indifferently transmitting data
to customers were not "fixed" in the sense of existing for more than
transitory duration, and as a result, the ISP could not be liable under
the Copyright Act for direct infringement.61 The court reasoned that
although data was downloaded (and, therefore, copied) to the
owner's computer in the process of transmitting the data, the
52. See id. at 518.
53. See id.
54. See id. ("In the absence of ownership of the copyright or express permission by
license, [copying] constitute[s] copyright infringement.").
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Kan.
1995) (listing four cases that match the holding in MAI).
57. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 301-02, 112 Stat. 2860,
2886-87 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2000)).
58. See 2 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.08[D][1] (2006).
59. Examples of ISPs are businesses like cable companies providing cable modem
service, other companies providing DSL service, or universities providing network access
to their students. See, e.g., ISP, in DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING, supra note 4, at 276-77
("ISPs are usually commercial companies. They often provide e-mail and other
information services as part of the service contract.").
60. 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
61. Id. at 551.
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downloading was "a temporary, automatic response to the user's
request, and the entire system function[ed] solely to transmit the
user's data to the Internet. '62 Though this may at first glance appear
to soften the MAI holding with respect to fixation in a computer's
RAM, the court carefully distinguished the situation for ISPs from
the situation for individual users. The court warned, "We do not hold
that a computer owner who downloads copyrighted software onto a
computer cannot infringe the software's copyright., 63 By focusing on
the fact that an ISP is indifferent to the data that it passes along to
users, the court shifted responsibility onto those who are interested in
what the data is-the users who requested it.
Once an individual computer owner receives the data she
requested, the data serves the purpose the individual computer owner
intended, making the copying more than merely transitory.64 The
court then defines "transitory duration" (which negates fixation) in
both quantitative and qualitative terms: "It is quantitative insofar as
it describes the period during which the function occurs, and it is
qualitative in the sense that it describes the status of transition.
65
Because the user's desired use for any data copied into RAM, or
any other device, is far different from the ISP's, a user's copy is far
less likely to be "transitory" under the qualitative standard, even if
the ISP and the end user store a copy for the same quantitative time
period. Therefore, even for technologically similar copying, an end
user might be making a "copy" for infringement purposes while the
ISP does not. CoStar does not soften MAI for end users at all.
Instead, it strengthens the MAI holding by shifting responsibility to
those with a qualitatively greater interest in the data transmitted.
B. Removal of Statutory Formalities
Copyright protection in this country began as a voluntary
system.66 In order to obtain copyright protection, authors of creative
works were required to take certain steps, often referred to as
"formalities." '67 For instance, authors needed to put a copyright





66. See Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. C-04-1127 MMC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24090, at *9-




forfeiture of the work to the public domain.6" In addition, authors
had to register their work with the United States Copyright Office.69
After registering their works under the old system, owners of
copyrights received an automatic initial term of protection after
registration, followed by a renewal term if requested by the author.7 °
Under the current laws, these formalities have all been removed.
In 1989, Congress did away with the notice requirement in
compliance with the Berne Convention Act,71 which eliminated the
need for formalities. 72  The registration requirement is no longer a
prerequisite to copyright protection.73 Finally, renewal terms became
automatic instead of optional in 1992 with the passage of the
Copyright Renewal Act.74 Today, the United States has a copyright
system where any work containing a certain minimal amount of
creativity 75 automatically receives copyright protection from the
moment it is fixed,76 extending through an automatic term of at least
seventy years.77 An author cannot decline copyright protection, and it
is not clear if an author can put a work in the public domain should he
wish to do so. 78 The closest he might be able to get a copyrighted
work to public domain status is to grant everyone in the world a
nonexclusive irrevocable license.79
Looking both at the broad definition of "copy" and at the
removal of copyright formalities, the scope of the problem becomes
clearer. The number of works subject to copyright is enormous and
68. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1077 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 9
(1982)) (repealed 1988).
69. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 411 (7th ed. 2006).
70. See id. at 323.
71. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2000) (stating that "a notice of copyright ... may" be used,
but is not required).
73. See id. § 408(a) (stating that "registration is not a condition of copyright
protection").
74. See id. § 304(a) (listing certain older works in which renewal terms vest
automatically); id. § 302 (creating one single term for works created after 1977).
75. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
76. Works are protected from the moment they are fixed in "any tangible medium of
expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
77. See Lolly Gasaway, When U.S. Works Pass into the Public Domain, http://www.
unc.edu/-unclng/public-d.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
78. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
135 (2004).
79. Even an "irrevocable" license may be subject to termination under 17 U.S.C.
§ 203(a)(5). Also, a public domain ("PD") donation as a contract would be without
consideration.
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growing rapidly. Much of this work is put on the Internet, where it is
literally impossible for end users to view or otherwise utilize it
without making a "copy." With so many people accessing (and
therefore copying) so much copyrighted work online, there needs to
be a legal mechanism that explains how and when this is permitted.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED LICENSE DOCTRINE
Copyright owners are free to assign or license their rights to
others. Section 204 of the Copyright Act imposes a writing
requirement for transfers of copyright ownership.8" A "transfer of
copyright ownership" is defined as including "assignment" and
"exclusive license," but "not ... a nonexclusive license."81
Nonexclusive licenses do not have to be in writing; they "may
therefore be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.
8 2
The application of the applied license doctrine is discussed in the next
section.
A. Traditional Implied License Cases
Often, parties simply do not think about copyright before
entering into agreements. The leading case for implied copyright
licenses is a good example. In Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen,83 one
party orally agreed to create special effects for a movie.' The special
effects were made and included in the movie, and after a monetary
dispute, the party who created the copyrighted special effects sued
the requesting party for copyright infringement." The creating party
owned the copyright and only turned over particular copies of the
special effects shots for the movie; it did not give the requesting party
the right to copy and distribute the work.86 The implied license
doctrine was used here as it is traditionally used: to insert some
common sense into the dispute. The work was obviously created for
the specific purpose for which it was actually used (creation and
distribution of a movie) and copyright law should not undermine the
clearly manifested intent of both parties. By allowing the law to
imply that the requesting party is licensed to use the work as
80. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
81. Id. § 101.
82. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 10.03[A][7].
83. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).





intended, the implied license doctrine functioned to eliminate the gap
between the law and the reality of the situation.
Courts have treated Effects Associates as creating a three-part
test to determine when a nonexclusive license might be implied. As
restated in a later case,
Under the Effects Associates test, an "implied nonexclusive
license" for use of an otherwise copyright protected work is
created "when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation
of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular
work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and
(3) the licensor intends that the licensee copy and distribute his
work."87
Other circuits have followed the Ninth Circuit's Effects Associates
rule,"8 some with a particular focus on intent.8 9 The rule can be
summarized as requiring (1) a request that a work be made;
(2) creation and delivery of that work; and (3) intent that the work be
copied and distributed.
This formulation of the implied license test seems particularly
well suited for situations in which the parties could have structured a
deal under the work-for-hire doctrine,9 ° but for some reason did not.
In other words, when one party requests that another create
copyrighted work, either the requesting party or the creating party
could own the copyright. If the work-for-hire doctrine applies, the
requesting party owns the copyright.91 If it does not, the requesting
party owns only the particular material object in which a copy is
embodied, and the creator retains the copyright. Therefore, without
87. Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002)
(describing the test from Effects Associates).
88. See, e.g., Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 990-92 (D.C. Cir. 2003); I.A.E., Inc. v.
Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996).
89. See, e.g., John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26,
40 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The touchstone for finding an implied license ... is intent."); Nelson-
Salabes, Inc., 284 F.3d at 515 (calling intent "the determinative question"); Johnson v.
Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 502 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Without intent, there can be no implied
license.").
90. For any "work made for hire" as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101, "the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
Thus, when the work-for-hire doctrine applies, copyright of a work belongs to the hiring
party.
91. Id. § 201.
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the implied license doctrine, the recipient of the work cannot copy or
distribute it92 because she does not own the copyright. 93
B. Lexmark
Conduct that can imply a copyright license has, until recently,94
been limited to cases in which there is direct dealing between just a
few parties, as in Effects Associates. A recent Sixth Circuit case
indicated, however, that the doctrine might apply to very large classes
of people as well. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.,95 printer and ink manufacturer Lexmark sued
Static Control Components ("SCC") under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act for selling chips that allowed third-party ink cartridge
remanufacturers to refill Lexmark "Prebate" cartridges for use in
Lexmark printers.96 The majority found in SCC's favor, but Judge
Feikens, dissenting in part, reasoned that the implied license doctrine
would not have given printer owners an implied license covering the
use of Lexmark's copyrighted Toner Loading Program ("TLP") after
refilling the "Prebate" ink cartridge because the shrinkwrap license
explicitly stated that customers must return those cartridges after the
first use. 97 He then revisited the idea of the implied license and stated
that even though the majority did not use the words "implied
license," he believed that the idea of an implied license was implicit in
its opinion.98 He argued that each purchaser of a Lexmark printer is
given "an implied license to use the [software that controls the
printer] for the life of that printer."99
Although Judge Feikens's statements were not in the majority
opinion, because he did not explain the elements of an implied license
or cite any case that used one, his analysis might be instructive as to
how judges might apply the implied license doctrine in cases involving
nontraditional circumstances. He would have limited the scope of
any implied license for use of the TLP based on an express license
92. See id. § 106(3).
93. See id. § 202 ("Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the
copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does
transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey
property rights in any material object.").
94. See infra Part IV.
95. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
96. Id. at 522, 529.
97. Id. at 563 (Feikens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 564.
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(the shrinkwrap license), while allowing the license for the software
controlling the printer to last for the life of the printer."° Thus, Judge
Feikens's focus on the terms of the express shrinkwrap license,
combined with the common sense idea that people should be
expected to be able to use the printers they buy, appears to create a
focus on the intent of the parties as evidenced by their contractual
dealings and marketplace norms.
Judge Feikens's version of the implied license differs significantly
in structure and effect from the three-part test in Effects Associates.
It seems that he would essentially ignore the first prong, the request
that the work be created, and the second prong, fulfillment and
delivery of the requested work. While there was still delivery of a
printer to a customer, it was not requested in advance by the
customer. Only the third prong would be clearly relevant in his
application, reinforcing the argument that the third is the most
important prong. This third prong of Effects Associates, whether the
licensor intends that the work be copied and distributed, is really
what aligns the implied license doctrine with common sense. By
looking at the intent of the licensor, courts can prevent the situation
where one party uses copyright law to block a transaction that was
clearly intended by the parties, which is especially important when
the parties do not know anything about copyright when they enter
into the transaction.
The application suggested by Judge Feikens's opinion in
Lexmark would have been a small step toward modifying the Effects
Associates test to allow it to apply to parties whose dealings are not as
direct and personal as those contemplated in Effects Associates. By
removing the first two prongs and focusing on intent of the licensor,
the implied license doctrine might function better in situations in
which the parties are not involved in direct person-to-person
transactions. For instance, this third-prong-only version would permit
Lexmark's many customers to receive an implied license from
Lexmark, even though none of them requested that Lexmark make
anything at all.
C. State Contract Law, Meeting of the Minds, and Federal
Preemption
A summary of current law involving the implied license doctrine
would be incomplete without a look at the relation between state
contract law and federal copyright law, and a discussion of which law
100. Id.
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applies to implied copyright licenses. For example, the precedential
value of a Ninth Circuit implied license case in the Second Circuit
depends largely on whether the circuit courts are applying federal law
or state law. If a Ninth Circuit decision relies heavily on California
state law, for instance, a district court in New York would give the
decision less weight. On the other hand, if a Ninth Circuit decision
relies on federal copyright law, a district court in New York could
give the decision more consideration.
The implied license doctrine arises by implication from the
copyright statute,'' making federal copyright law appear to be a
reasonable choice of law. However, the implied license acts in a
similar manner to an implied contract, suggesting a role for state law.
This exact question was raised in Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v.
Musil Govan Azzalino, °2 in which the Ninth Circuit began its
opinion: "In this copyright case, we must decide an issue unaddressed
by our prior decisions: Which law, state or federal, governs the
creation of an implied, nonexclusive copyright license?""0 3 Foad was
the first case to address this question. Unfortunately, it did little to
clarify the situation. The majority held that for the question of
whether an implied license can be granted at all, federal law provides
the answer, but for determining whether an implied license has
actually been granted, state law applies. °4
In Foad, the preliminary issue decided was whether the court
should apply California's parol evidence rule or federal common
law." 5 In deciding to apply state law, the majority first stated the
following general rule: "Where the Copyright Act does not address
an issue, we turn to state law to resolve the matter, so long as state
law does not otherwise conflict with the Copyright Act."'0 6 Applying
this principle, the court considered whether the state parol evidence
rules in California conflict with copyright law or policy at the federal
level, and concluded that there was no conflict.0 7 The court's
reasoning was that implied licenses do not require a writing at all, so
there is no reason to think that federal law would look only within the
four corners of the contract document to find an implied license.
0 8
Accordingly, the use of state law for determining whether to admit
101. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
102. 270 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2001).
103. Id. at 823-24.
104. Id. at 824.
105. Id. at 826.
106. Id. at 827.
107. Id. at 828.
108. Id.
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parol evidence to aid in interpretation of a contract that one party
says grants an implied license does not present any conflict with
federal copyright law or the underlying policy. 109
The problems with the majority opinion were made clear by
Judge Kozinski (who wrote the Effects Associates opinion) in his
concurrence in Foad. After admonishing the majority for deciding "a
difficult question that bears some analysis" without the benefit of
briefing or even argument in the court below, he stated that he would
have liked to have seen an explanation of the majority's conclusion
that state law should apply.11° Kozinski explained his confusion as
follows:
As best I can tell, the majority assumes that anything that is
called a contract-including an implied contract-must be
governed by state law. But not every implied contract is, in
fact, a contract. Certainly, some implied contracts are governed
by state law. Those contracts really are contracts; they are
actual agreements between parties, albeit imperfectly
articulated. The cases on which the majority relies all involve
this type of contract.
But there is another type of implied contract, one that is
"created otherwise than by assent and without any words or
conduct that are interpreted as promissory." Such an implied
contract is not a contract at all; it is a legal obligation the law
imposes between certain parties where there is no actual
agreement between them. If the implied contract that gives rise
to the nonexclusive license discussed in Effects Associates is this
kind of contract, then it has nothing at all to do with contract
law. Rather, it is an incident of the copyright and is therefore
governed by federal law."1
Because Judge Kozinski viewed the decision he wrote in Effects
Associates as clearly implying the creation of federal law, he would
have applied federal law in Foad instead.1 2 In addition, he pointed
out numerous flaws".3 in the majority's application of state law, an
109. Id.
110. Id. at 832 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
111. Id. (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 833.
113. First, claiming it was applying state law, the majority inferred an implied license
from the "absence of a contrary agreement" in the terms of the contract without citing any
state law authority for that type of inference. Id. Second, "the majority's conclusion that
an indemnification clause creates a presumption that the indemnified-for act is authorized
is almost certainly inconsistent with state law." Id. Third, it does not make sense to
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application that he argued "makes about as much sense as calculating
how high is up. '"114 After poking holes in the majority's analysis,
Kozinski stated that in other cases in which the choice of parol
evidence rules might be relevant (which he said in this case it is not),
the preemption analysis needs to provide "certainty and
predictability" in the law governing copyright transfers in accordance
with the policy underlying federal copyright law."5  Kozinski
concluded by warning that he "can only hope that future courts will
not give undue deference to the majority's answer to a question that
was neither posed by the parties nor presented by the facts of the case
before us."' 16
The effect of Foad remains to be seen. A handful of cases have
cited Foad for the proposition that state law applies in determining
whether or not an implied license exists." 7 One case citing Foad
noted the conflict between the majority opinion and Judge Kozinski's
concurrence, and decided not to address it." 8 The analysis of cases
that deal with the use of state contract law in implied contract
situations without the guidance of Foad is even more confusing.
Sometimes courts seem to apply state law for procedural convenience
only. For example, one case applied state law only because the
district court below also did-at no point did the parties contest the
application of state law. 9
Amongst the other cases that appear to apply state contract-like
principles, two cases are often cited. First, in Allen-Myland, Inc. v.
International Business Machines Corp. ,120 the court stated that implied
licenses can result only from the parties' objective conduct, from
which a reasonable person would understand that the parties have
reached an agreement, and never from one party's "unilateral
consider whether a supposed already-existing implied license under the contract terms
would be defeated by parol evidence; instead, extrinsic evidence is relevant only to
determine whether there is an implied license to begin with. See id. at 834. Fourth, the
majority does not cite the Copyright Act's preemption provision, which at best makes the
preemption analysis "incomplete." See id.
114. Id. at 833.
115. Id. at 834.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Scholastic Entm't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 988 (9th
Cir. 2003); Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003); Tim
Vining Real Estate Appraiser and Consultants, Inc. v. Clark Jennings & Assocs., No. CV-
04-3110-RHW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20832, at *7-8 (E.D. Wash. June 23, 2005).
118. See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 41 n.6
(1st Cir. 2003).
119. Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 2003).
120. 746 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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expectations," unless those unilateral expectations were purposely
induced by "unscrupulous conduct of the other party."1 21  This
principle has its roots in De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v. United
States,'122 a 1927 patent case in which the Court held that an implied
license may exist where "[a]ny language used by the owner of the
patent, or any conduct on his part exhibited to another from which
that other may properly infer that the owner consents to his use
.... ,23 Second, in N.A.D.A. Services Corp. v. Business Data of
Virginia, Inc.,'24 a district court held that "[t]he creation of an implied
license, as in the creation of any implied contract, requires a meeting
of the minds," without explaining why, without citing a single case,
and without stating whether it was applying state law or not.
2
1
Modern courts that use state contract-like language, as is used in
Allen-Myland and in N.A.D.A., cite these two cases and others that
followed them.126 When cases involving the applicability of implied
licenses do not even mention if they are applying state or federal law,
and the cases they cite are all federal cases which themselves do not
clearly apply state or federal law, it becomes very difficult to
determine what the court is doing. The court could either be applying
its own state law without saying so, or creating federal common law.
Unfortunately, the only analysis of this issue currently comes from
Foad, which, as Judge Kozinski wrote, is riddled with problems.27
In the future, courts may follow Foad and find a role for state
law, or they may follow Judge Kozinski's view of his own opinion in
Effects Associates as indicated in his Foad concurrence. In writing the
Effects Associates opinion, Judge Kozinski relied heavily on another
case 128 that seemed to deal with implied licenses as a doctrine
stemming from copyright law without discussing the role of state law
121. Id. at 549 (quoting Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. Lock Tech. Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
122. 273 U.S. 236 (1927).
123. Id. at 241.
124. 651 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Va. 1986).
125. Id. at 49.
126. See, e.g., SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 317-18
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). In 2004, the same court, following SHL Imaging, refused to find an
implied license where there was no meeting of the minds. Ulloa v. Universal Music &
Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). One year later, the
same court again stated that in order to find that an implied license exists, the proponent
of the license must show a meeting of the minds "as determined by contract law." Pavlica
v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
127. Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 833-34 (9th
Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
128. The case was Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984). See Foad, 270 F.3d at 838
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
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in implied licenses at all.129 The broad appeal of Effects Associates
and the reliance by other circuits on that case may be due to its
departure from earlier cases that seemed grounded in state contract
law principles. 3 '
At least one thing is clear about this federal preemption
problem: it is not resolved. If a court takes up the difficult task of
trying to provide clear answers, it should carefully consider how its
decision will affect the applicability of the implied license doctrine
and the ability of copyright law "to protect copyright holders in a
comprehensive and uniform way."' 31 With the ability of the Internet
to make state borders invisible and seemingly meaningless, it will be
hard to maintain uniformity without a federal standard.'32  In
addition, the ability of the implied license to operate in situations
where parties deal with each other only indirectly through the
Internet would be greatly hindered if a "meeting of the minds"-type
requirement were imposed in those situations, as described in the
next Part.
IV. FIELD V. GOOGLE
In order to take the implied license from its traditional
interpretation in Effects Associates and apply it to an Internet
context, even more stretching is needed than what Judge Feikens
would have allowed in Lexmark. In January 2006, a federal district
court in Nevada did just this in Field v. Google, Inc.,13 3 and applied
what appears to be an entirely new rule for determining whether an
implied license exists.3 3 This case raises a host of fascinating issues
and new viewpoints relevant to this Comment.
A. Facts and Background
Among other services, Google provides a very popular Internet
search engine that allows users to find information efficiently.'35 In
order to make the vast number of web pages searchable, Google uses
129. Boryana Zeitz, Comment, "How High Is Up": Interstitial Dilemmas in
Nonexclusive Copyright Licensing Cases in the Ninth Circuit, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 429,
442 (2004).
130. Id. at 442-43.
131. Foley v. Luster, 249 F.3d 1281,1287 (11th Cir. 2001).
132. Zeitz, supra note 129, at 447-49 (considering thoroughly the development of a
federal common law test).
133. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
134. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
135. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
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its robot, called Googlebot, to index 136 pages automatically. 13 7 As
Googlebot analyzes each web page to add it to Google's index, it
makes a copy of that page and stores it as a cached copy of the
page. 3 8 When a Google user performs a web search and the results of
the search return a particular page, those search results also often
include a link to the cached copy of the page that Google has
stored.39 A Google user can then click on the link to the cached page
and Google will automatically send the cached copy to the user's
browser. 4° Because Google's cached copy is a "copy" for copyright
purposes, 4' by traditional copyright analysis, Google is committing
rampant copyright infringement through its caching program unless
there is an exception, such as fair use, that applies. Until Field,
however, Google had never been sued for this practice.'42
Perhaps in recognition of this conflict, Google attempts to
respect the rights of copyright owners by providing an opt-out
system'43 through which all website owners, regardless of the
copyright status of the work on their site, can instruct Google not to
search and cache their websites. Google even provides instructions
on how to opt out on its website.'" There are several ways that
website owners can communicate to Google their desire to opt out of
Google's index. First, using the Robot Exclusion Protocol, site
owners can create a file called "robots.txt" that instructs search
engines on what parts of the site to index.'45 This file can single out
specific search engines by giving individualized instructions to that
engine's robot (e.g., Google's Googlebot), and can single out specific
directories and even specific file types on the site to be treated
differently.'46 The robots.txt file can only instruct search engines
136. Indexing is the process of scanning through all of the data on a page and adding it
to Google's index. The concept is similar to combing through the text of a normal book
and compiling an index to include in the back of the book. See supra note 22.
137. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1111.
140. Id.
141. See supra Part II.A.
142. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
143. An opt-in system where Google contacts every website owner is not possible
because the Internet is too big. Id. at 1112.
144. Id. These instructions are available from Google at http://www.google.com/
remove.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) and also from The Web Robots Pages at
http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/exclusion.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
145. This protocol has been "widely recognized ... as a standard for controlling
automated access to Web pages since 1994." Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
146. See, e.g., Webmaster Help Center, http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/
bin/answer/py?answer=35301&topic=8459 (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) (providing
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whether or not to index the site; the robots.txt file cannot instruct
robots on whether or not to cache the site. However, pages that are
not in Google's index will not be accessible through cached links
because they will never be included in search results; thus, the
robots.txt file can effectively prevent caching by opting out of
Google's index.
Second, using meta-tags, 147 site owners can include instructions
on each individual page describing what uses Google and other search
engines may make of the page. 148 Unlike the robots.txt approach, the
use of meta-tags allows the owner of each page to specify separately
whether the page should be indexed 149 and/or cached.15 ° Meta-tags
are embedded in each individual page, whereas robots.txt files must
be stored on the root folder of the server on which the pages reside.
Because website owners do not always have permission to write to




Third, requests can be made directly to Google to remove pages
from Google's index or cache. 152 It is important to note that all three
of these approaches-robots.txt, meta-tags, and direct requests-are
voluntary on Google's part. There is no technological mechanism
that prevents search engines like Google from indexing or caching
sites, even if they are explicitly instructed not to do so.153 Google
chooses to be a "polite" search engine that respects the wishes of
website owners. All three approaches are best characterized as
putting Google on notice as to what the website owner intends
instructions for singling out specific directories and files for different treatment by
Google's search engine).
147. As used here, meta-tags are segments of HTML code designed to be used by
computers, not humans, and are not even shown to human users when the HTML is
displayed in an ordinary browser. See, e.g., HTML Meta Element, http://www.w3schools.
com/html/html-meta.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
148. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
149. Id. A meta-tag preventing indexing by Googlebot only would look like this:
<META NAME="GOOGLEBOT" CONTENT="NOINDEX, NOFOLLOW">.
150. Id. at 1112-13. A meta-tag preventing caching by Google only would look like
this: <META NAME="GOOGLEBOT" CONTENT="NOARCHIVE">.
151. See, e.g., The Web Robots FAQ, http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/faq.html#noindex
(last visited Mar. 2, 2007) ("Sometimes you cannot make a /robots.txt file, because you
don't administer the entire server.").
152. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1113 n.5. Google also has an automatic removal system,
located at http://www.google.com/webmasters/remove.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
153. An analogy can make this clearer: suppose trick-or-treating children on
Halloween come upon a box full of candy on someone's front porch that is accompanied
by a sign that says, "Please take one piece only." The sign does not prevent a child from
taking more, just like the robots.txt file does not prevent a search engine from
downloading and indexing a website.
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Google to do when it crawls the website. Whether this notice to
Google has any legal force at all is extremely unclear and not
previously litigated.
Blake Field, a Nevada attorney154 and regular Google user,'55
noticed that this practice by Google might be a legal problem and
"decided to manufacture" a copyright infringement claim against
Google to try to make some money from Google's caching practice.1
5 6
He created fifty-one works,157 registered copyrights in those works,'58
and put the works on a website that he created. He did not use any
meta-tags, but he did include a robots.txt file that instructed all robots
to crawl and index his entire site.'59 He waited for Google to
automatically index his page, and once Google's search results
included a link to a cached copy of the page stored on Google's
server,16° Field sued Google for copyright infringement. His amended
claim sought over $2.5 million in damages.'6 1
B. The Outcome
The district court in Nevada rejected Field's claim, finding that
Google did not directly infringe Field's copyright. 162 Further, it held
that even if Google had infringed, it could succeed on an implied
154. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
155. Id. at 1113.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1114.
158. Id. Registration is not a requirement for copyright protection, but it is a
prerequisite for certain copyright infringement lawsuits. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000).
159. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. Field did this because he wanted his site to be
indexed by search engines and included in search results. Id. This is a puzzling choice by
Field because Google will also crawl pages without any robots.txt file at all.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1110.
162. Id. at 1115. Because Field did not allege any indirect (contributory or vicarious)
infringement by Google, the court only had to decide if Google directly infringed Field's
copyright. Id. at 1114 n.8. The only infringement that Field alleged was the copy that was
made when third-party Google users clicked on the "Cached" link from Google's search
results and the cached copy of Field's work was sent to those users. Id. at 1115. The court
specifically notes that "Field [did] not allege that Google committed infringement when its
Googlebot, like an ordinary Internet user, made the initial copies of the Web pages
containing his copyrighted works and store[d] those copies in the Google cache." Id.
Copyright law requires "volitional conduct" by the defendant to reach a finding of
direct infringement. Id. Because "it is the user, not Google, who creates and downloads a
copy of the cached Web page," and because Google acts in a "passive" manner only,
"[tihe automated, non-volitional conduct by Google in response to a user's request" is not
direct copyright infringement. Id. The court does not suggest one way or another what
the result would have been if Field had also alleged that Googlebot's original copying
during indexing was infringing. See id.
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license defense or three other affirmative defenses: 63 estoppel,1" fair
use,165 and § 512(b) safe harbor.166  Although the implied license
defense received less treatment in the opinion than any of the other
four defenses, it may be the most important in terms of precedential
value, as it is a step toward moving the implied license doctrine in a
new direction.
Until this point, the mainstream implied license doctrine was still
represented by the three-prong test from Effects Associates.167  The
greatest deviation so far from the Effects Associates test seems to be a
dissenting opinion in Lexmark that would have effectively dropped
the first two prongs from the Effects Associates test, leaving only the
third prong, focused on the licensor's intent.1 68 The district court in
Field took a completely new approach from the one found in Effects
Associates, effectively creating a new application for the implied
license doctrine. The Field court cited Effects Associates only for the
163. See id. at 1115-23.
164. Google succeeded on the estoppel defense because: (1) Field knew that Google
was offering the cached copies; (2) Google had a right to believe that Field intended
Google to rely on his conduct; (3) Google did not know Field's true desire not to have his
works cached; and (4) Google relied to its detriment on Field's failure to opt out. Id. at
1123; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 13.07 ("Principles of estoppel
applicable elsewhere in the law are equally applicable in copyright infringement actions.").
165. Google succeeded on the fair use defense because the first and fourth fair use
factors favored Google heavily, along with Google's good faith compared to Field's lack of
good faith. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; see also infra notes 202-08 and accompanying
text (explaining the concept of fair use). The court's comprehensive fair use analysis in
this case deserves its own scholarly paper.
166. Google succeeded on the § 512(b) safe harbor defense for system caching because
(1) Google's storage of cached pages for fourteen to twenty days qualifies as
"intermediate and temporary storage of that material"; (2) the material that Field made
available was transmitted to Google at Google's request; and (3) Google's caching of webpages is " 'an automat[ed] technical process ... for the purpose of making the material
available to users .. . who ... request access to the material from' " Google. Field, 412 F.
Supp. 2d at 1124 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1) (2000)); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 58, § 12B.03[A] ("For [this provision] to apply, the material must be made
available on an originating site, transmitted at the direction of another person through the
system or network operated by or for the service provider to a different person, and stored
through an automatic technical process so that users of the system or network who
subsequently request access to the material from the originating site may obtain access to
the material from the system or network." (quoting the legislative history)).
The court's finding that fourteen to twenty days is "intermediate and temporary"
is an interesting characterization. Google's cache of a website that remains unchanged
indefinitely will also contain the exact same data indefinitely, and it does not make sense
that the mere fact that Google rechecks every twenty days to see if anything has changed
makes the cached copy anything less than permanent.
167. Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
168. See supra Part III.B.
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proposition that a license is a defense to copyright infringement.169
Even though Effects Associates is considered the leading case for the
definition of implied copyright licenses, the Field court failed to
mention Effects Associates at all after this, and instead cited one of
the leading implied license cases from the field of patent law, a 1927
Supreme Court case, for the definition of an implied license.
170
Effects Associates was decided by the Ninth Circuit, and is therefore
binding on the district court in Nevada that decided Field.
Nevertheless, the Field court seems to have chosen its citations
carefully to reach its final result.
The court decided it needed a new starting point for defining the
implied license test to better fit this situation. Citing De Forest,7' the
Field court stated that a court may find an implied license exists
where the copyright owner's conduct permits the other party to
"properly infer" that the copyright owner has consented to the other
party's use. 72 The court continued to cite a pair of copyright cases
from district courts in other circuits 173 for the proposition that a
copyright owner's consent does not need to be manifested verbally,
and can be inferred even in silence if the copyright owner knows of
the use and encourages it. 174  Curiously, instead of citing any case
from its own Ninth Circuit, the Field court chose to cite cases that had
remarkably little to say about the implied license doctrine and did not
even explicitly state what is required to raise a successful implied
license defense. 75
169. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
170. See id. at 1116 (citing De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236
(1927)). The De Forest case was also discussed in this Comment's section on state law and
federal preemption. See supra Part III.C.
171. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
172. Id. (citing De Forest, 273 U.S. at 241).
173. The Field court cited both a New York district court case, Keane Dealer Servs.,
Inc. v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y 1997), and a Michigan district court case, Quinn v.
City of Detroit, 23 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
174. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
175. Keane includes one eight-sentence paragraph on deciding whether or not there is
an implied license, Keane, 968 F. Supp. at 947, and Quinn devotes a single seven-sentence
paragraph to implied license. Quinn, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 749. Stranger still is that the
proposition for which Keane is cited by Field is obtained by Keane from a Seventh Circuit
case, I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 774-75 (7th Cir. 1996). In Shaver, the court
discusses implied license in significantly more depth than in Keane, including an
explanation of the Effects Associates test. See Shaver, 74 F.3d at 774-76. Keane cites only
a brief part of the Shaver opinion, which does not include the Effects Associates test. See
Keane, 968 F. Supp. at 947 (citing Shaver, 74 F.3d at 775).
Though seven or eight sentences can certainly be informative and descriptive of
any legal doctrine, it is unusual that these cases were cited when there is much more
written on implied licenses, especially from more authoritative courts. It almost appears
2007]
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The Field court developed its implied license doctrine, in part,
based on the language from Keane Dealer Services, Inc. v. Harts,
which stated that consent given by "lack of objection" can create an
implied license.176 Field crafted this into a new two-part test for
implied license. Under this test, an implied license is found when the
copyright owner (1) "knows of the use" and (2) "encourages it."'
1 77
Although it is immediately clear that this test is different from and
much broader than the traditional Effects Associates test, 78 the Field
court further stretched the implied license doctrine by its fairly broad
interpretations of both "knowledge" and "encouragement."
Applying this new test to the facts before it, the court first noted
that Field admitted he was aware of the mechanisms, which are well-
known and highly publicized industry standards, of using "no-
archive" meta-tags to communicate his preferences to Google; Field
also knew that use of such a meta-tag would have conveyed his wishes
to Google concerning the use of cached links to his pages. 79 With full
knowledge of the ability to opt out of Google's caching program,
Field decided not to use this mechanism, leading Google to the
conclusion that he had consented to allow access to his pages via
Google's "cached" links.18° He chose not to opt out specifically
because he believed, as a copyright owner, that it was not his burden
to opt out of Google's caching program; instead, he probably (and
reasonably) thought that the opt-in nature of copyright law 8' put the
burden on Google to secure his permission. He thought Google was
acting illegally in offering the cached copy of his work to its users.
Field's knowledge that Google would interpret his failure to opt out
of the caching program as permission was the precise problem that his
suit raised. Field probably asked himself: why should I have to
specifically tell Google not to violate my rights?
If widely followed by other courts in the future, the Field court's
conclusion with regard to implied license may rival the importance of
that the Field court did some serious searching for implied license cases that did not
mention the Effects Associates test. If this is the case, it might explain the odd selection of
the non-Ninth Circuit court cases it cited.
176. Keane, 968 F. Supp. at 947 (citing Shaver, 74 F.3d at 775).
177. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
178. Under this test, none of the Effects Associates prongs remain. Under the new
Field test, not even the third prong related to the intent of the licensor, which the
dissenting judge in Lexmark would have retained, remains. The new test, with the two
prongs of knowledge and encouragement, is much better suited to the context of
interactions where parties do not engage in direct, personal interactions.
179. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
180. Id. at 1117.
181. See supra Part I.B.
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the 1984 case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,182
which established the legality of the sale of VCR-style recording
devices. 83 First, it may rival Sony as one of the most important
developments in the history of copyright law, in terms of its role in
reconciling the nature of copyright law with the realities that
technology imposes on it. Second, it may rival Sony in the amount of
opposition the doctrine gains as it is applied to new technologies that
do not yet exist. The Field court briefly summarized its findings and
stated its conclusion:
Thus, with knowledge of how Google would use the
copyrighted works he placed on those pages, and with
knowledge that he could prevent such use, Field instead made a
conscious decision to permit it. His conduct is reasonably
interpreted as the grant of a license to Google for that use.184
The significance of this holding is that for the first time a court
has validated an opt-out system with respect to copyright by allowing
failure to use a known opt-out system to result in an implied license.
Unfortunately, the court's analysis explaining why it actually found an
implied license is not clearly separated into the two prongs of
knowledge of the use and encouragement of the use, making it
difficult to determine how each prong was satisfied.
1. Knowledge and Use
According to the Field court, the first element of creating an
implied license is that the copyright holder "knows of the use" of the
copyrighted material.' The court found that Field knew (by his own
admission) about the opt-out mechanism and that Google would copy
his work if he failed to opt out, interpreting this as permission to copy
the work.'86  This finding is noteworthy for a few reasons. First,
because Field had no personal interaction with anyone at Google, it
182. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
183. Id. at 442 (holding that "the sale of copying equipment ... does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is.. . capable of substantial noninfringing uses").
184. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. This conclusion is supported by citing Keane again,
this time for the proposition that a "copyright owner's knowledge of defendant's use
coupled with owner's silence constituted an implied license." Id. (citing Keane Dealer
Servs. v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). Note, however, the difference in
personal distance between the parties. In Keane, the parties actually worked together for
the same employer creating the copyrighted software that was the subject of the copyright
claim. Keane, 968 F. Supp. at 946. In Field, the parties did not know each other or directly
interact at all until after Field filed his complaint. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
185. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
186. Id.
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would have been extremely hard for him to know for sure how
Google would interpret his failure to opt out. At the time Googlebot
crawled Field's website, Google had no way of knowing what level of
technical expertise Field possessed, and whether or not he knew the
slightest thing about meta-tags. In addition, Field may not have
known whether Google would interpret his failure to opt out as
"permission" because Google may not believe it even needs
permission, as suggested by its success on fair use and safe harbor
defenses in this case.' 87 In spite of these observations, it is a fair
characterization to say that under the court's analysis, Field satisfied
the knowledge requirement by knowing of Google's use of the opt-
out system to determine what to cache and what not to cache.'88
2. Encouragement
The part of the opinion discussing the encouragement prong
stated that because Field knew how to opt out and failed to do so, he
"made a conscious decision to permit" Google to cache his web
page. 89 This is a serious stretch of the word "encouragement"
because Google had no idea what Field's state of mind was until his
complaint was filed. To outside observers, Field did absolutely
nothing. Google had no way of knowing whether Field specifically
chose not to opt out or simply failed to for some other reason. All
Google would have been able to know at the time was whether Field
used meta-tags to opt out. Here, he did not, and Google would have
had no idea why not. He might have forgotten; he might have tried to
but used incorrect syntax; he might not have known how; he might
have decided against it; or, as was the case here, he might have been
trying to manufacture a lawsuit against Google. The point is that
''encouragement" will be inferred from a copyright owner's actions.
Despite the court's use of the phrase "conscious decision to permit"
in defining "encouragement," a party does not need actual knowledge
of a copyright owner's state of mind to satisfy the encouragement
prong of the Field test.
Summing up, the two-part knowledge and encouragement test
that Field purports to apply boils down to the following: where a
copyright owner (like Field) knows about an opt-out system (like
Google's cache) and purposely fails to opt out, an implied license is
created. The burden to opt out is on the copyright owner-if he does
187. See supra notes 165-66.




not, the use will be allowed by an implied license. To those who
adhere to the traditional notion that copyright law should remain only
an opt-in system, this approach would seem inherently wrong.
C. A Broader Reading of Field
How broad is this new implied license doctrine from Field? A
major factor in how widely applicable Field may become is how
courts will interpret the knowledge requirement. Here, Field knew of
the opt-out system, but this was revealed only after the matter came
before the court and Field admitted he knew about it. Perhaps
recognizing that bad facts sometimes make bad law, and that crafting
a new implied license test around a manufactured claim such as
Field's might result in a test that is limited in applicability, the Field
court worked some possible wiggle room into the knowledge
requirement. The court mentioned that the opt-out system was a
widely known industry standard several times in the opinion,
including once immediately before stating that Field knew about it.19 °
In the court's application of its new implied license test, the
knowledge requirement was clearly met because Field admitted to
knowing about the system.
Why would it matter how well known the opt-out system was if
Field knew about it? With the inclusion of this factor, the court lays
the foundation for a new implied license test with extraordinary
promise. The court's recognition that the opt-out mechanism is
widely known could serve several related functions. First, the court
might have wanted to leave open the possibility that constructive
knowledge may satisfy the knowledge requirement.191 Second, the
court may have been trying to show that the burden this new test
190. See id. at 1112 ("The Internet industry has developed a set of widely recognized
and well-publicized industry standard protocols."); id. at 1113 ("The 'no-archive' meta-tag
has been a widely recognized industry standard for years."); id. at 1116 (stating that "site
publishers typically communicate their permissions to Internet search engines ... using
'meta-tags,' " and that "the 'no-archive' meta-tag is a highly publicized and well-known
industry standard").
191. A court might find that the opt-out system is so well known and easy to learn that
anyone who puts copyrighted work online is deemed to have constructive knowledge of
that system. If courts do not favor such a broad interpretation of the knowledge
requirement for implied license, they might instead need to determine precisely when
copyright or website owners can be considered to have constructive knowledge. Courts
may differentiate between different types of website owners. For example, larger
institutions could be assumed to know more. Courts could also consider what other meta-
data the website contains (other uses of meta-tags providing instructions to robots could
indicate knowledge), whether there is a robots.txt page (suggesting some technical
knowledge of robot behavior in general), whether any express terms of use suggest
knowledge of robot activity, or a number of other factors.
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imposes on the copyright owner is a light one. That is, when the opt-
out system is widely known, the burden on the copyright owner might
appear to be light because opting out is not an obscure process that
requires the copyright owner to engage in undue research to learn
how to opt out. Finally, the court may have decided that industry
standards and customs are important factors in deciding whether to
find an implied license in any given situation. As in the related field
of contract law, customs and standards are important factors in
discerning intent and in deciding what actions and behaviors are
reasonable.192
This broad reading of the Field court's "knowledge" requirement
would go a long way to resolve the conflict between the opt-out
Internet and the opt-in copyright system. By taking widely known
industry customs and standards into account, the implied license
doctrine can serve as the mechanism to harmonize copyright with
many of the seemingly incongruent systems that make the Internet so
valuable. Because any shift of a burden to opt out to the copyright
owner is a departure from any copyright scheme currently in effect,
courts may seek a mechanism within the framework of existing
copyright law, such as fair use. Under current law, implied license
and fair use are the primary copyright doctrines that could
realistically reconcile the opt-out Internet with the opt-in copyright
regime. 191 Due to reasons discussed in the next Part, implied license is
a much better solution for this problem than fair use.
V. WHY IMPLIED LICENSE INSTEAD OF FAIR USE?
A. What's Wrong with Fair Use?
Implied license and fair use are similar in that they are both
affirmative defenses to copyright infringement. Both were used
successfully by Google in Field, and each independently provided
Google with an affirmative defense.194 The court's order, however,
has about seven times more text dedicated to the fair use defense
192. See 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.14 (1998).
193. Fair use became important as an affirmative defense for new technologies that
enable new types of use, especially after Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), which upheld the district court's decision that private time-
shifting of television programs using the Sony Betamax, a device similar to a VCR, is a fair
use. See id. at 442.
194. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1115-16, 1117-23.
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than to implied license.195 This disparity hints at one of the reasons
the implied license doctrine is a better solution: fair use is extremely
complicated. Despite codification in its own section in the Copyright
Act, 96 holding a central role in at least three United States Supreme
Court opinions, 97 and appearing in hundreds of cases 9 ' and
thousands of law review articles, 99 the fair use doctrine is one of the
most difficult to predict, hardest to apply, and most misunderstood
legal doctrines in copyright law.2 0  As technology develops,
expanding the number of uses that are possible, deciding when each
of those uses qualifies as fair use will become even more complex.2"'
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that a copyright
owner's exclusive rights are limited so that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work" is "not an infringement of copyright.""2 2  The
statute provides a nonexclusive, illustrative list of uses that qualify as
fair use, including "criticism, comment, news reporting ... teaching,
scholarship, [and] research. 20 3  The statute continues to list four
factors that must be considered in every fair use determination.2°
195. See id. at 1115-16 (devoting about one page to implied license); id. at 1117-23
(devoting about seven pages to fair use).
196. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
197. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (holding the lower
court committed error by ruling that 2 Live Crew's parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" was
not fair use solely because it was a commercial use); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (holding that The Nation magazine's use of exact
quotes from former President Ford's autobiography before its publication was not fair
use); Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
198. A LexisNexis search on January 12, 2006, of all cases, with the search query:
"atleast2(fair use) and atleast2(copyright)" returned 777 cases.
199. The same search query in "US law reviews and journals, combined" on the same
day returned more than 3,000 results.
200. One case calls the doctrine of fair use "the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright." 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 13.05 (citing Dellar v. Samuel
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam)). Another notes that the
"doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition." Id. (citing
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). Campbell, Harper
& Row, and Sony "were overturned at each level of review, two of them by split opinions
at the Supreme Court level." Id.
201. As a result of the utter lack of predictability in interpreting the statute and case
law, as well as the enormous statutory damages looming as a potential punishment for
crossing too far over the fair use line, certain sectors of the public that rely on the fair use
doctrine in day-to-day operations have negotiated fair use guidelines that establish certain
uses to be "fair use" as agreed upon by the interested parties. See, e.g., Guidelines For
Classroom Copying of Books and Periodicals, http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/
INTELLECTUALPROPERTY/clasguid.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (providing
classroom fair use guidelines).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
203. Id.
204. Id.
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The first factor is the purpose and character of the use, including
whether the use is for commercial or educational purposes.2 °5 The
second factor is the nature of the copyrighted work.2 6  The third
factor is the amount of the protected work that is used by the
allegedly infringing work.0 7 The fourth factor is the effect of the new
use on any potential market for the copyrighted work or the work's
value. 08
The central relevant difference between the doctrines of fair use
and implied license is the role of the copyright owner's intent. Fair
use permits partial and sometimes total copying of copyrighted works
without the owner's permission.20 9 Fair use does not take the intent
of the copyright owner into consideration-in fact, fair use is a
successful defense even if the copyright holder vehemently opposes
the use. Sometimes, courts have made this characteristic somewhat
unclear. For example, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,21° the Supreme Court stated that "[f]air use was
traditionally defined as 'a privilege in others than the owner of the
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent.' "211 Almost immediately after stating that the
use is without the consent of the author, however, the Court added
that an "author's consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted
works [had] always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident
of the constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and
the useful arts 2 12 and that "the fair use doctrine was predicated on
the author's implied consent to 'reasonable and customary' use when
he released his work for public consumption." '  Note the
contradiction: at the same time, fair use can be made without the
copyright owner's consent, and the copyright owner's consent is
implied for that use. One cannot simultaneously do something with
and without the consent of another. Accordingly, this historic view of





209. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake
of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1643 (2004).
210. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
211. Id. at 549 (citation omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 550 (citations omitted).
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... is manifestly a fiction. '214  Some of the fair uses explicitly
mentioned in the preamble of § 107, such as criticism and parody,
would often be entirely blocked if every author's permission was
necessary.
Why was the Harper & Row Court discussing author consent if
fair use does not respect it? Because Harper & Row dealt with an
unpublished work,215 the Court was looking at the circumstances
surrounding publication.216 Note how the language above hinges on
the condition that the author "released his work for public
consumption., 217  Back when copyright was not automatically
attached at fixation and instead attached only at publication with
notice of copyright, 218 it made sense to think of the system as a
tradeoff. Once the author published a work and secured the
copyright, the work was no longer privately held by the author, and
the author could no longer control the use of the work. 219 The author
could be said to assent to whatever uses were "reasonable and
customary" because the author made the decision to publish the work
with knowledge of the uses people would make of the work after it
was published. The quid pro quo was that in exchange for the
copyright protection obtained by publication, an author accepted the
reality of reasonable and customary uses, fully aware that there was
nothing she could do to stop such uses. In this sense, fair use cannot
be described as an opt-in or opt-out system. Rather, the copyright
owner is treated as opting in, without the ability to opt out.
Through its discussion of author consent, the Harper & Row
opinion illuminates the reason the implied license doctrine is a better
defense than fair use in many cases. The Court merely stated that
when an author decides to publish something, people are going to use
it in certain "reasonable and customary" ways.22 ° In a context similar
to the Field case, both the fair use and the implied license defenses
can be used to implement the common sense idea that when a website
goes up on the Internet, users will make reasonable and customary
use of the website. However, especially in new industries based on
new technologies, what is reasonable and customary is far from clear.
214. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, § 13.05. Professor Nimmer explains, "A
restrictive legend on a work prohibiting copying in whole or in part gives no greater
protection than the copyright notice standing alone." Id.
215. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542.
216. See id. at 542-44.
217. Id. at 550.
218. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 58, at OV-3 (Overview).
219. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549-51.
220. See id.
2007]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Even if a new technology enables a new use that is reasonable, it
cannot immediately become "customary" because not enough time
has passed for customs to develop. Thus, for uses that are not
reasonable and customary, another mechanism is needed, because
there is no tacit consent in the Harper & Row tradeoff sense
described above.22' Where more deference to the copyright owner's
permission is needed, the implied license doctrine as used in Field has
the ability to respect the wishes of the copyright owner through the
adoption of an opt-out system.
Unlike fair use, implied license retains an important and central
role for intent of the copyright holder. Even if implied licenses are
granted based on a broad interpretation of the Field test's knowledge
prong, so that the copyright holder's permission might be assumed
unless she opts out, the act of opting out remains as a simple way for
the copyright owner to immediately prevent the grant of an implied
license. Where fair use provides an "automatically in" system,
implied license provides an option to opt out, allowing for greater
respect of the copyright owner's rights.
222
Because fair use fits more naturally where the copyright owner's
intent is not important, it maintains a crucial role in a different set of
situations dealing with the widespread copying and distribution of
copyrighted works on the Internet. Whenever a copyrighted work is
made available online by someone other than the copyright owner
without permission of the owner, the implied license doctrine cannot
be used as a defense, as third parties cannot grant rights they do not
even have to others.223 For instance, under the Field test, the second
prong involving encouragement by the copyright owner could never
be satisfied by the actions of an unauthorized third party who has no
rights in the first place. In these cases, fair use is a much more
appropriate defense.224
221. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
222. In Field, the role of the ability to opt out was minor in the fair use analysis. See
Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1119 (D. Nev. 2006). The ability of site owners
to "disable the cache functionality ... in a matter of seconds" weighs in the first factor
toward Google since it makes the use less of a substitute. Id. Because the first fair use
factor weighed heavily in Google's favor, see id. at 1118-20, and only the second factor
weighed against Google (and only slightly so), id. at 1120, the court probably would have
found fair use even without the opt-out procedure. If this is the case, then the implied
license defense is far less useful here; if fair use makes caching legal without the owner's
consent, it is a waste of time even to consider the intent of the owner with the implied
license defense.
223. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
224. See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal. 2006). In
Perfect 10, the court applied a fair use analysis to Google's "creation and display of
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The ability to respect the wishes of the copyright owner is only
one reason that implied license is a better solution than fair use.
Another reason is that a system based on implied licenses has the
potential to supply a clear, simple, bright-line rule that fair use is
inherently incapable of providing. 25 Fair use analysis requires the
balancing of at least four factors and perhaps also the comparative
good faith of the parties,226 while trying to find "equity" in the
process. While the Supreme Court appropriately downplays the
possibility of a bright-line approach because it would create an
inflexible fair use doctrine, the value of a clearer standard cannot be
overstated. Individuals and businesses simply cannot make educated
decisions about their behavior under the fair use regime because it is
too unpredictable.2 7
B. How Does Implied License Avoid the Problems Plaguing Fair
Use?
To review, the more flexible version of the Field implied license
doctrine discussed in this Comment generally is as follows: where a
copyright owner can prevent a use through a well-known opt-out
mechanism and does not, the law may allow the use by creating an
implied license. 28 The critical reader may wonder where the limits
are on such an implied license system. The very factors that make fair
use so unpredictable at least provide some limits to its application.
Thus, Field's implied license test would need some limits to prevent
some absurd consequences.
The fact that a system of use allows the copyright owner to opt
out. will not always justify the grant of an implied license if the owner
fails to opt out. As an extreme example, suppose a company, Pegleg,
thumbnails" based on images hosted on third-party websites that themselves infringed
Perfect 10's copyrights. Id. at 845. In this case, it would not make sense to look at
whether Perfect 10 granted Google an implied-license to create and display the thumbnail
images because Perfect 10 never made the images freely available. Rather, Perfect 10
chose to opt out of free availability by password protecting their site so only paying
customers could view their works. See id. at 832 n.3.
225. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31
("'Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and
over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine
is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts ....... "(quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679)). The Court also noted
that "[t]he Senate Committee similarly eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to fair use."
Id.
226. See Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
227. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
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decided to base its business model on pirating music recordings,
where it would purchase single copies of music CDs, copy them onto
blank discs, and sell thousands of the "burned" copies online and on
the streets at less than retail cost. Clearly, this is an infringement of
copyright and could land Pegleg's employees and owners in federal
prison.2 9 It would be ludicrous to convert this business model from
criminal to legitimate merely because Pegleg provides an opt-out
mechanism widely known in the music industry.
What, then, are the relevant differences between the opt-out
caching system that Google operates and Pegleg's opt-out piracy
business that make the former acceptable and the latter
unacceptable? The difference relates to the reasonableness of finding
the copyright owner's consent. The Field implied license cannot
operate without the copyright owner's consent. While the owner's
consent can be implied, it cannot be implied in a manifestly
unreasonable manner. Thus, the assumption that a copyright owner
impliedly consents to piracy is completely unreasonable, but implied
consent to Google's caching program was reasonable, as the Field
court found.23 °
This reasonableness determination does not have to rely on the
same type of factors utilized when determining whether a use is a fair
use. Instead, the reasonableness standard can consider common
practices based on current industry customs and standards and widely
held practices. In Field, the court stated that there was no direct
infringement at all and that even if there had been direct
infringement, the fair use defense and the statutory safe harbor would
apply as well. 231' Therefore, two defenses establish that in a general
sense, Google's caching practice is not illegal. Even if the legal status
of Google's caching was unclear before Field, it was never an
unquestionably infringing use. It was a widely used practice that no
cases had found to be infringing activity, and no statute specifically
prohibited.232 For these reasons, implied consent is reasonable to
assume. In stark contrast to Field is Pegleg, whose piracy is not
reasonably regarded as legal under any current interpretation of the
229. Copyright infringement is usually a civil matter, but there are also criminal
provisions of the Copyright Act, and extreme cases are prosecuted criminally. See 17
U.S.C. § 506 (2000).
230. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (finding that Field's "conduct is reasonably
interpreted as the grant of a license to Google").
231. See supra notes 165-66.
232. See Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 n.2, 1116 (noting that caching is a common
practice among search engines). The Field court did not cite any authority that treated
caching as an infringing action.
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law and is not a common practice in any legitimate industry. Thus, to
prevent the absurd conclusion that the Field decision could legitimize
otherwise obviously illegal uses, all that is needed is to recognize that
those uses are indisputably illegal, and any implied consent to those
uses is therefore unreasonable.
C. Application to New Technologies
Of course, the legal status of new technological uses of
copyrighted works will almost always be undetermined at the
inception of such use, especially when a change in technology raises
new questions of law, policy, and practice. In these cases, whether the
new use is clearly unreasonable, as is the Pegleg business model, may
be in the eye of the beholder. When the new use first arises, it is not a
good time for an opt-out policy to allow grants of implied licenses. At
its inception, the new use is simply too tentative to be firmly
established as an Internet custom or an industry standard practice. If
Internet users find the new service helpful, and it becomes popular,
then other similar uses will arise. In Field, the court noted that
Google is not the only search engine that provides links to cached
pages. Yahoo! and MSN have programs identical to Google's.2 33 The
passage of time without incident also contributes to the establishment
of such a system as reasonably accepted by the industry and users.
For example, Google's caching practice is widely known and had
never been challenged in court even after several years of practice.
As the number of services based on the new use increase, and as these
uses become part of the menu of services available to online users
who have no reason to think the new use is problematic, the public
reliance on those services also grows. At the point when services
based on the new use are widely available and accepted as the way
things are, the new use will have matured into the type of use for
which implied licenses become possible. Search engine caching is
exactly this type of practice: it is widely done and accepted, and the
public relies on it.
An example of a relatively new use that could not be
characterized as an accepted new use is the unauthorized copying of
music over peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks.234 Even if it is still widely
233. Id. at 1111 n.2.
234. P2P networks offer a distributed, rather than centralized, mode of distribution.
They are often called file-sharing networks because they efficiently permit large numbers
of users to share files without overburdening any particular computer. MGM Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005).
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practiced,235 it is by no means widely accepted. There have been
lawsuits from the beginning, both against the P2P services 236 and their
users.237  The affected interest groups have again and again voiced
their dissatisfaction with these services.238 Even before the first P2P
lawsuits were decided and the potential of a fair use defense for these
services was not yet eliminated,239 it was clear that P2P music sharing
raised serious copyright issues to which the answers were unclear at
best. For these reasons, P2P systems, like the old version of Napster,
could not have avoided liability simply by offering copyright owners
the chance to opt out.
24°
The limitation preventing the Field test from applying to cases
like that of Pegleg is crucial to enclose the Field test within reasonable
boundaries of use, even though it was included only implicitly in Field
itself.241 As a result, for the remainder of this paper, this limitation is
treated as an additional factor to consider in the Field test. With this
third factor, the implied license test from Field should not be a thorn
in the side of copyright owners who have to take yet another step to
protect their works. Instead, it will be an instrument to provide
certainty where industry and the public at large have justifiably come
to rely on certain uses as acceptable. Part VI briefly surveys a
number of possible applications of the implied license doctrine to
other technologies, including a few of Google's other projects.
235. See, e.g., John Boudreau, Illegal File Sharing Showing No Letup, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 3, 2006, at E3, available at 2006 WLNR 11507396.
236. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (concerning the
Grokster and Morpheus P2P services); A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001) (concerning the Napster peer-to-peer service).
237. See Press Release, Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Announces
New Round of Music Theft Lawsuits (Feb. 28, 2006), http://www.riaa.com/news/
newsletter/022806_2.asp.
238. See, e.g., Recording Industry Association of America, Online Piracy and
Electronic Theft, http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/online.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007);
Motion Picture Association of America, Internet Piracy, http://www.mpaa.org/
piracyjinternet.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
239. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1017.
240. In fact, the court's initial order before shutting down Napster was essentially an
opt-out system. The court ordered Napster to remove access to certain works. Napster,
239 F.3d at 1011 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal.
2000)). This system did not work, but if it had, there would have been an interesting
implied license issue in old Napster's future. If it became common practice for copyright
owners to request exclusion from Napster, and this became the accepted industry model
for P2P music sharing, then failure of a copyright owner to opt out may have implied a
license under the Field analysis. This, however, never occurred.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 230-33.
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VI. THE IMPLIED LICENSE DOCTRINE AS A GAP-FILLER
In order to illustrate how useful the Field implied license
doctrine may be, and also to illustrate its limitations, this Part
describes three different uses for copyrighted works: browsing,
indexing, and translating. Each is analyzed with respect to the
flexible implied license doctrine from Field. A common practice that
is very well suited for an application of the implied license doctrine is
ordinary web browsing, which is considered first. The second
practice, indexing the web, is likewise a fairly strong case for implied
license. The third practice, automated language translation, presents
a harder case for implied license.
A. Browsing by Individuals
Individuals, in the course of ordinary web browsing activity,
normally make copies of the websites they visit both in RAM and in a
cache folder on a disk drive. 42 These qualify as copies under the MAI
definition,243 and therefore are potentially infringing copies when the
websites contain copyrighted work. This is the problem raised in the
beginning of this Comment. 44 Surely, a court would strive to find a
way to avoid making every Internet user in the country a copyright
infringer due to browsing activity alone. Although this may appear to
be only an academic concern, it needs to be addressed. If the gap
between the law and technology is ignored without considering the
ways in which the gap can be bridged, the gap may grow, creating an
even larger problem that must be dealt with in the future. The
possibility of infringement by browsing and the natural fit of the
implied license as a solution has been mentioned by some
commentators,245 though the prior analysis is somewhat clumsy
compared to what is now possible given the Field result.
Applying Field, the implied license seems to fit the situation.
First, browsing is a broadly used practice from which website owners
may opt out in well-known ways, such as through password
protection. Second, website owners encourage use by making the site
available without opting out. Finally, browsing is a common practice
by millions of people, which has never been seriously called into
242. See supra Part I.E.
243. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part I.E.
245. See, e.g., Comm. on Computer Law, Caching on the Internet and the Proxy
Caching Notice Project: Avoiding an Internet Copyright Dilemma, 52 REC. ASS'N B. CITY
N.Y. 968, 975-77 (1997); Allen R. Grogan, Implied Licensing Issues in the Online World,
COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1997, at 1, 2.
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question in a legal sense, and there is an enormous public reliance on
the noninfringing status of browsing.
Therefore, under Field, individual users would not be liable for
infringement because of browsing activity in situations where
copyright owners make their works available on the Internet. This
analysis is premised on the idea that making a work available online
makes it freely available to all users. This is true in a technological
sense. If a work is placed in a directory on a web server without
access control, it can be downloaded by any person who knows the
location of that work on the web server. In essence, one only needs
to know where to look. To those who know where to look, the work
in that location is freely available. The Field court made this
observation several times.246 The implied license defense is an ideal
mechanism for explaining why most users browsing the web are not
committing copyright infringement. As evidenced by the decision to
put something online, a copyright owner usually expects that users
will make use of the work using widely available browsers that
operate in ordinary ways, which involves making copies.247
246. See Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1114 (D. Nev. 2006) (stating that
Field created his website and "published his works on pages where they were accessible,
for free, to the world"). Since he used a permissive robots.txt file, the court concluded
that he "sought to make his works available to the widest possible audience for free." Id.
at 1120. Then, the court stated that Field made his "works available to the public for free
in their entirety." Id. at 1121. It is unclear how much of the court's determination that
anything on the Internet is "available for free" relied on Field's permissive robots.txt file.
247. In another recent case, Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal.
2006), the court included a footnote stating that when Google automatically distributes
thumbnail images which are then locally cached by a browser, this distribution by Google
probably constitutes fair use. Id. at 845 n.l. The court did not mention whether this is
likely fair use at the user's end, but similar reasoning may apply. While fair use may also
provide a defense to infringement based on locally cached copies, this defense is better
suited to cases where there is some indication that the copyright owner did not want users
to make any copies at all, including local cache copies. These situations are typically the
oddball cases where a copyright owner has put works on a site with the notice similar to
"you have no permission to make any copies of this work" or where a copyright owner
places something online and does not expect that anyone else will discover it. A fair use
defense could handle these situations if a court is unwilling or unable to find an implied
license.
Because the expectation in this oddball example may sound like an unreasonable
one, a different example might help clarify this situation. If I had a folder in my university
webspace to temporarily store my work (located hypothetically at http://www.unc.edu/
-jsieman/myprintfolder), including drafts of this Comment, I could conveniently print my
work from any campus computer lab by pointing my browser to the web folder. There is
no "web page"; instead, there is only a directory listing of my files. Technologically, these
files might be freely available to anyone who knows where to look, but realistically,
because no other person or search engine knows about this folder, no one is likely to ever
find my work because it would require someone else to guess that I have a folder called
"myprintfolder" on my personal webspace.
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B. Indexing by Google
In Field, the court carefully defined the activity Field alleged was
infringing by explaining that "Field [did] not allege that Google
committed infringement when its 'Googlebot,' like an ordinary
Internet user, made the initial copies of the Web pages containing his
copyrighted work and store[d] those copies in the Google cache." '248
The court did not say what the result would have been had Field
alleged that Google's activity was infringing. However, based on the
holding in the case, it is fairly clear that the implied license defense
would apply here, too. First, website operators can easily opt out of
having their pages crawled and indexed using either robots.txt or
meta-tags, both of which are widely known and were actually known
by Field.249 Second, Field did not opt out using any of these
mechanisms.5 0 Third, using "web spider" programs to crawl and
make copies is a common and crucial practice in the search industry.
Any successful litigation over automated spider activity has been
limited to trespassing due to excessive spider activity."' One court
even found copies made via spider activity to be fair use.252 With no
other legal controversy hovering over copies made by spiders, and
with the enormous degree of public reliance on search engines,
spider-based copying is the type of activity for which the implied
license would provide a successful defense.
If the copying that occurs during indexing of web pages by
electronic spiders is noninfringing due to the implied license defense,
an immediate extension of this reasoning might suggest that the same
defense might apply to indexing of print works. Google recently
began an extraordinarily ambitious program where it will scan the
printed collections of some of the world's largest libraries in an
attempt to make the wealth of information available in book form as
easily searchable as works available online. 53 The public benefit of
248. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
249. Id. at 1113-14.
250. Id. at 1114. In fact, Field not only failed to opt out, he voluntarily opted in with a
permissive robots.txt file. Id.
251. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (agreeing
with the district court's finding that Verio's "performing multiple automated successive
queries[] consumed a significant portion of the capacity of Register's computer systems");
Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (dealing
with the accusation that a spider was trespassing, not infringing copyright).
252. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH (VBKx), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003).
253. See Google Book Search Library Partners, http://print.google.com/googlebooks/
partners.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); Google Books Search Library Project,
http:/[books.google.com/googlebooks/library.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
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this program would be incalculable. Although Google decided to
offer copyright owners an easy way to opt out of this program, 54 the
Author's Guild quickly filed a lawsuit against Google based on this
project,255 followed by another suit by the Association of American
Publishers. 6
Implied license is likely not the best defense for Google in this
situation. While an opt-out mechanism is available, this is not the
type of use where a license can be reasonably implied, due to the bias
against new technology described above.257  An endeavor such as
Google Book Search Library Project has never been attempted
before, and the legal issues are far from clear. Similar to P2P music
sharing, the legality of the project has been challenged from the very
beginning.258 Neither the search industry nor the public has built up
any reliance on the legality of this project. A fair use argument may
protect Google, 259 but implied license is not an appropriate defense in
this situation.
C. Translating by Google
The Copyright Act provides that a copyright owner's exclusive
rights include the right to create derivative works based on the
protected work. 26 The term "derivative work" is defined to include
"translation." 261 Google provides a service that offers to translate
foreign language websites on the fly,262 and also operates a website
where an individual can have any particular site translated from one
254. See Google Book Search Publisher Questions, http://print.google.com/googleprint/
publisher-library.html#options3 (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
255. See Class Action Complaint at 2, Author's Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05CV8136
(S.D.N.Y. Sept 20, 2005), available at http://eff.org/legal/cases/authorsguild-v-google/
complaint.pdf.
256. See Complaint at 2, McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Google, Inc., No. 05CV8881 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://publishers.org/press/pdf/40%20McGraw-Hill%20v.%20
Google.pdf.
257. See supra Part IV.C.
258. See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., JONATHAN BAND, THE GOOGLE PRINT LIBRARY PROJECr: A
COPYRIGHT ANALYSIS 5, http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googleprint.pdf (last
visited Feb. 18, 2007). This is one legal analysis to which Google links as representative of
its legal position. See Google Book Search: News & Views, http://books.google.com/
googlebooks/newsviews/legal.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
260. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
261. Id. § 101.
262. Although these automated translations are often far from perfect, § 101 of the




language to another.26 3 Permission is rarely explicitly granted for
translation of a web page into other languages, so the copyright
question considered here is whether this is an infringing use, or
whether Google can take advantage of an implied license defense.
The immediate problem for an implied license for translation is
that there is no clear opt-out mechanism. 2' 4  There is nothing a
copyright owner can do to prevent Google from translating an
otherwise freely available website if a third party requests that
Google translate the work, just as there is nothing that can stop a
human from translating a page of a book onto a sheet of paper.
Because the first prong fails, the other prongs need not be considered,
and the Field test fails. Although the Field implied license defense
will not protect Google in its translation program, Google may still
have a fair use defense against claims of infringement.
D. Other Projects
The implied license may have applicability in a wide range of
other projects, including variants of search engine activity like Google
News, 265 Google Image Search, 266 news syndication uses like RSS
267
feed readers,268 ordinary forwarding of e-mails, 269 and archiving by the
Internet Archive.270
263. See Google Language Tools, http://www.google.com/language-tools (last visited
Feb. 18, 2007).
264. In theory, the Internet industry could develop a custom to respect a hypothetical
"no-translate" meta-tag, but nothing like this is in common use today.
265. Google News, http://news.google.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). Google takes
news from the websites of different news organizations, categorizes them, and reproduces
headlines, text snippets, and thumbnail images from those stories on its own news page.
See About Google News, http://news.google.com/intl/en-us/about-google-news.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2007).
266. Google indexes images available on the web and makes them searchable to
Google users. It reproduces and hosts small, thumbnail-sized images to make searching
through images easier. See Google Image Search, http://images.google.com (last visited
Feb. 18, 2007).
267. RSS stands for "Really Simple Syndication." When a website offers an RSS feed,
users can receive headlines from that site using a wide variety of software. Whether a
website's offering of RSS feeds grants a copyright license to potential RSS users is unclear.
See RSS Specifications, http://www.rss-specifications.com/the-copyright-debate.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2007).
268. Google does not allow website owners to remove their feeds from Google users'
feedreaders. See Google Webmaster Help Center, Remove a RSS or Atom Feed,
http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=35311 (last visited
Feb. 18, 2007).
269. For e-mail forwarding, the practice has become so common that corporate e-mail
servers often append notice to outgoing e-mail messages that forwarding is not permitted.
Perhaps this could be seen as the ability to opt out. See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr.,
Copyright in E-mail, J. ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING, Sept. 1999, http://www.press.umich.
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CONCLUSION
The promise of the flexible implied license doctrine for the
Internet as presented in Field lies in its ability to make room within
copyright law for broad opt-out systems of use that cannot efficiently
operate in any other way. The reduction in transaction costs can be
enormous, and parties can act with greater certainty when they can
count on their behavior being considered legal based on implied
licenses. When the only reason to think that a use is infringing is the
inherent incompatibility of the opt-in Copyright Act with the opt-out
Internet, and everything else suggests the use is compatible with the
wishes of the copyright owner, including industry customs and
widespread public reliance, the implied license doctrine can play the
role of simple common sense.
JOHN S. SIEMAN
edu/jep/05-01/field.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) ("Writers who post messages to public
e-mail lists should contemplate, for example, both forwarding and archiving. It is
reasonable to assume that they have given permission unless it is explicitly denied.").
270. See Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
[Vol. 85
